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December 1971 
"If economists could manage to get themselves 
thouiht of as humble, competent people, on a 
level with dentists, that would be splendid!n 
J. H. Keynes 
I 
In dealing with questions of macroeconomic policy, there is a fairly 
well developed theory whose central theorem can be summarized as saying 
that in a world of perfect certainty one needs at least as many instruments 
of policy as independent policy objectives if all objectives are to be 
objectives exceeds the number of instruments,achieved; when the number of macro 
one deals with the evaluation of trade-offs among objectives. In general 
equilibrium theory one objective--such as maximizing consumers' utility 
or achieving a Pareto optimtll:1 ("efficient") production mix--is postulated, and 
then one derives the necessary and sufficient conditions for an "efficient" 
~~ 
We have benefitted from discussions with Richard Helson and Howard 
Portions of this research were supported by National Science FoundationPack. 
Grant GS2804. However, the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Foundation. 
-
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situation. Huch analytical work then concentrates on the impact of one market 
imperfection, such as a uniform tariff on imports, the existence of one 
monopolist among a group of competitive industries, or the existence of a 
single technological external economy or diseconomy in a society. For example, 
Johnson and Mieszkowski recently analyzed the impact of labor unions in the ; 
United States under the assumptions that all other factor markets are perfectly 
competitive and that final product markets are competitive.
1 
The analysis changes when we are dealing with an economy that has more 
than one market imperfection. The General Theorem of the Second Best 
states "• •• in a situation in which there exist many constraints which prevent 
the fulfillment of the Paretian optimum conditions, the removal of any one 
constraint may affect ~-rnlfare or efficiency either by raising it, by lowering 
it1 or by leaving it unchanged."
2 
This theorem does not prevent some professional economists from offering 
what they claim is "objective" ad~ice on partial economic re£e?m. Such 
advice frequently appears to be of the following sort: (1) scan the real 
world until one observes something that diverges from one of the theoretically 
derived £'luilibrium conditions for an "efficient" economy, (2) recommend that 
this discrepancy be entirely eliminated by a set of new policies, and 
(3) occasionally note that the government should make "lump-sum" transfers 
1Harry G. Johnson and Peter Hieszkowski, "The Effedts of Unionization 
on the Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium Approach,~ Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 84 (Uovember 1970), pp. 539-561~ 
2&. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, "The General Theory of Second Best," 
Review of Econonic Studies, Vol. 24 (1956-57), p. 12. 
-3-,. 
of income to those hurt by the reform. Government officials tend to move 
more slowly than their advisors wish, perhaps because of a feeling that the 
future environment is highly uncertain, that present actioµs tend to have 
unforeseen consequences, that social experiments are f~equently irreversible, 
and lump sum transfers of income will not be made, 
The impact of market imperfections may also be mitigated by macroeconomic 
policy. For example, Brimmer finds that the inflationary period in the U.S. 
from 1965-1968 was accompanied by an increase from 55 percent to 63 percent 
in the ratio of median non-white family income to median white family income. 
The "distortion of inflation"--in Brimrner's words--apparently partially 
offset the impact of (past end present) racial discrimination in the labor market. 
1 
The proclivity of economists confidently to offer policy advice after 
studying only one part of a real economy may stem from an intuitive belief 
that in most cases reducing the number of imperfections in the economy 
is unlikely to reduce total output; we know of no'analysis that suggests 
even a vague probability of such an occurence. One major area where theoretical 
analysis has demonstrated a Second Best case is in tariff policy, where world 
output may fall when tariffs by some countries are eliminated while tariffs 
against other countries are maintained (i.eo, more trade diversion than trade 
creation may result from the creation of a customs unior1) •. 
This paper uses a simple theoretical model to generate a numerical 
example where the elimination qf an imperfection in one input market--
1Andrew F" Brimmer, "Inflation and Income Distribution in the United 
States," Review of Economics and Statistics, 53 (February 1971), PI>• 37-48. 
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say labor--leads to a lower level of real output when th
e imperfection in 
the second input market--say capital--is maintained~ F
ollowing the presentation 
of the general model in the next section, the following 
section solves the 
model for some specific numberical examples, which in tu
rn are the basis for some 
general conclusions in the last section~ 
II 
Following the precedents of Fishlow and David and of Joh
nson,
1 who 
analyzed some of the problems in this area, we consider tw
o outputs--
1A. Fishlow and P. David, "Optimal Resource Allocation in
 an Imperfect 
Market Setting," Journal of Political Economy, 69 (Decem
ber 1961), pp. 
529-546. Harry G. Johnson, "Factor Market Distortions and 
the Shape 
of the Transformation Curve," Econometrica, 34 (July 1966),
 pp. 686-698. 
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agriculture (A) and manufacturing (11/--and two inputs labor (L) and 
capital (K),
2 and we ignore any dynamic effects--such as the effect of dis-
tortions on savings. He assume each output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Let Q.
J. 
be the quantity of the ith good produced and 
Li and Ki be the amounts of labor and capital allocated to the production 
of the ith commodity. 
a¾_l-aA
(II - 1) Q
A 
= 1A A where O < aA < 1 
al~-aH
(II - 2) L.,,r r where O < a < 1QH = 
. .L'l 1'1 n 
The total supplies of labor (L) and of capital (K) in the economy 
are held constant: 
(II 3) 
(II - 4) ICA + 1):I = K 
We wish to maximize the value of the combined output of agriculture 
and manufacturing (Y), with the prices (PA and PU) being fixed~ 
(II - 5) 
1The labels of output are obviously unimportant. One might identify 
the two sectors as large firms and small firms, unionized firms and non­
unionized firms, or domestic firms and firms m-med by foreigners. 
2For those who dislike talking about short-run shifts in the allocation 
of a stock of capital and a price of capital, the second input could be 
considered as imported rau materials, whose value is fixed by the net flow 
of foreign capital into the country; as will be discussed later on, we assume 
the value of exports of final goods equals the value of imports of final goods~ 
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This procedure allows us to avoid specifying a utility functi-01)~ 
Fishlow and David did), and we rationalize it in one of two ways: 
(i) governments frequently announce an objective of achieving a ,c,ertain 
level of real output over the next few years in "constant prices," which in 
practice either are the prices observed in some base period (the actual 
working of the economy) or are prices set by the government's planners 
{representing the planners' utility function) or 
(ii) international trade theory shows how a society maximizes its 
"utility" by producing at the point on its transformation curve that 
maximizes its output valued at world prices and then trading at world 
prices to reach its highest "indifference curve"; for a "small" country world 
prices can be taken as exogenous. 
We introduce market distortions into our soGiety by stipulating that for 
a particular input its price in one sector is some constant (Di) times its 
price in the other sector:1 
(II - 6) where DK > 0PKM = DKPKA 
(II - 7) where DL > OPLH = DLPLA 
Market distortions (D # 1 and/or DK# 1) may occur for reasons such1 
as: (i) governments (or other groups) adopt policies--such as minimum wage 
legislation or differential taxes on capital-which differentially affect 
prices in the two sectors or (ii) inputs are allocated to firms by means 
other than market prices, such as licensing of capital or imports. We assume--
1Johnson introduces a single distortion by stipulating that 
Pl<l/PLM # PKA/PLA• Johnson, op. cit. 
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based on the characteristics of some developing countries-that the manufactud.ng. 
sector faces a lower price for capital and a higher price for labor than 
does the agricultural sector.
1 We further assume that producers in each 
sector maximize profits, which implies that the capital labor ratio is higher 
in manufacturing and lower in agricutture than it would be in the presence 
of perfect factor markets. We assume the economy is in equilibrium when 
profits are zero in both sectors. We also assume that in equilibrium there 
is a positive marginal productivity of both labor and capital in both 
manufacturing and agriculture (i.e., there is no corner solution). Some 
readers may feel this last assumption makes our analysis inapplicable to 
developing countries with "surplus labor." Rather than attempt to survey 
the extensive literature on "labor surplus economies," we simply note while 
this model does not describe such economies, the problems of partial economic 
reforms can occur also in these economies. 
1
Not all cconooists would consider this a realistic assumption~ 
Iida says that in Japan every factor earns more in the "modern" sector 
than it does in the "backward" sector. Tsuneo Iida, "A Non-Neoclassical 
Analysis of Resource Allocation in the Dual Economy," Economic Journal. 
75 {September 1965), p. 557. 
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III 
To get numerical solutions, we assume that firms maximize profits and 
face output prices of PA= P11 = 1 and th
at the technological coefficients
1 
of the econo~y are now specified as follows: 
L.8K.2(III - 1) QA = A A 
QH = L .41)6(III - 2) 11 1 
(III - 3) LA+ ½,t = 100 
(III - 4) KA+ 1)1 = 100 
y:::: QA+ QB(III - 5) 
(III - 6) PK11 = .SPKA 
(III - 7) PLH = l.22PLA 
These factor market distortions are plausible for developing countries. 
Williamson estimates that within manufacturing in the Phillipines in 1966, 
wages in one SIC sector were as low as 59 percent of wages in another SIC 
sector, capital costs were as low as 51 percent of capital costs in another 
sector, and the ratio of capital costs to labor costs in one sector was as 
low as 45 percent of another sector's ratio.
2 
1we note that we did not have to experiment with different sets 
of coefficients to obtain our results; this was the first set we tried. 
2Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Capital Accumulation, Labor Saving, and 
Labor Absorption Once Hore," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85 (February 1971), 
P• 52. 
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In this situation, real output is 106.860. With a perfect labor market 
(PLM = PLA) and a distorted capital market (PKH = .5PKA)' output is 105.835. 
output with two distortions is, with these par:"1:'.:'.e.t:3rs, grP.!lter than output with 
one distortion. Output with no distortions is 109.023. Thus the assumed 
discrepancies of 50 percent in the capital market and 22 percent in the labor 
1
market reduce output by only 2 percent. 
This result occurs even when the two distortions are, as in this 
P.xample, not in the same direction. One might expect that reducing the 
discrepancy in the ratio of the relative factor prices in the two sectors 
from .41 (.41 ~ .5/1.22) to .5 (.5 = .5/1) would increase income, but in fact 
it lowers the income that would be produced under our assumed behavioral 
rules. 
What is the economic explanation for these results? Since initially 
each sector was earning zero profits, at the initial levels of output agriculture 
will incur losses and manufacturing will show positive profits upon the elimina• 
tion of the wage di.s.tortion, as the initial effect will be to lower labor 
costs in manufacturing and to raise labor costs in agriculture•..So ..output 
of manufacturing will expand and output of agriculture will decline until 
each sector again earns zero profits. As labor and capital shift from agriculture 
to manufacturing, the prices of labor and of capital will be different 
in the new equilibrium positi·on than in the initi.al one. 
2 Because agriculture 
1The size of this reduction is consistent with the conclusions of 
Johnson, op. cit., and is dependent on the technological specification of the model. 
2In our computer program, we do not actually trace the transition from 
one equilibrium to another. Rather, we derive the transformation curve with 
find the point where the equilibriumone distortion and then scan it until we 
conditions are satisfied. This output point is then compared to the point 
on the two-distortion transformation curve ~here the equilibrium conditions 
are satisfied. 
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is more labor intensive than manufacturing, the new uniform wage rate is 
lower than the old separate w;1ge rates in both agriculture and manufacturing, 
and the new separate interest rates are higher in both sectors than the old 
separate inter est rates. 
Since the various transformation curves are so close together, we show 
in Figure I only the transformation curve representing a distorted capital 
market and a perfect labor market; this transformation curve is, of course, 
inside the (undrawn) transformation curve where both factor markets are perfect. 
Point 2A is the equilibrium point on the transformation curve (also not 
drawn) representing distortions in both factor markets. Point lB--on the 
transformation curve with one distortion--is superior to point 2A in the sense 
that a larger quantity of manufactures and the same quantity of agriculture 
Point lA gives a larger output (at the assumedis produced at lB than at 2A. 
world prices) than either points lB or lC. Yet with one dist©rtion society 
produces at point 1c~-1here profits are approximately zero--rather than at 
either lB or lA because at lB and lA large profits are earned in manufacturing. 
It should be noted that in the presence of distortions the world price ratio­
pp in diagram l--is not tangent to the transformation curve at the point 
where profit maximjzing firms produce.
l Profits are as shown below: 
1E. Hagen, "An Economic Justification of Protectionism," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 72 (November 1958), pp. 507-508. Hagen considers 











OUTPUT PROFITS in 
Point Agriculture Hanufacturing Agriculture Hanufacturing Fixed Prices 
A 56.211 52.811 .ooo .ooo 109.023 
lA 56.211 51.623 0 11.615 107.834 
lB 44.112 63,382 0 8.012 107.494 
0 105.835lC 28.377 77.458 0 
0 0 106.8602A 44.112 62.748 
This example simply reaffirms the obvious proposition that the results 
of economic policy depend on how producers respond to prices as well as on 
"technical" parameters. In the presence of distortions, real output could 
be greater if firms did not maximize profits. 
Suppose that for political reasons the distortion in the capital market 
cannot be eliminated. We have already shown that eliminating the distortion 
in the labor market will reduce output. To maximize output, one could reduce 
the distortion in the labor market and also introduce a distortion in the output
 
market. The output distortion takes the form of a tax on one commodity (or a 
subsidy on the other) so that the ratio of domestic output prices no longer 
equals the ratio of world output prices. In our example, a capital market 
distortion coefficient of .5, a labor market distortion coefficient of .5, 
•
and a ratio of domestic output prices of .5 will lead the economy to produce 
the same output--val11ed at world prices--as it would produce with no distortions
. 
The input price distortions are set so as to move the economy to the 
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transformation curve representing no input distortions, and the output 
distortion moves the-,..economy along this curve to the point (A in figure I) 
that maximizes the value (in world prices) of output produced. Thus three 
distortions are equivalent to no distortions. 
IV 
Suppose a decision maker wants his economy eventually to be free of 
distortions, He may then view implementing a set of micro policy reforms 
as an investment decision. He may agree with his technical advisor on the 
implications of a proposed set of policies and still refuse to implement it 
because the rate of return is less than his social rate of time discount. 
For example, suppose that the economy is initially as described. in Sections 
II and III, at the beginning of the first year the distortion ill the labor 
market will be eliminated, and at the beginning of the third year the distortion 
in the capital market will also be ,:emoved. So output in world prices will 
be as follows: 
Year Status Quo Policy Package-
1 106.86 105.84 
2 106.86 105.84 
3 106.86 109.02 
4 106.86 109,02 
The rate of return on this policy package is 3.9 percent over a three year 
time horizon .and about 45 percent over a four year time horizon, 
In his per¢eptive analysis of decision-making, Lindblom says ",.,a wise 
policy-makel' consequently expects that his policies will achieve only part 
of what he hopes and at the same ti~e will produce un~nticipated consequences 
he would have preferred to avoid ••• His decisior.. is only one step, one that 
if s.uccessful can quickly be followed by anothero •• 
111 If the indices by 
which "success" is measured are subject to "second-best" prcblems, then 
a decisiou<-maker may need the coa:i:ege to pur:::1_,_.~ a particular strategy in 
apparent disregard of the 11 fa.cts," Suppos~ the u!lderlying structure of the 
economy described above was unknown.) but it was observed by everyone that 
factor prices were unequ2.l in the two sectc,rsc The decision-maker is assumed 
to have enough data to compute o,_,tput <-1.t world prir.es and has secured agreement 
2 
that changes in output are the measure of the success of his program. 
Slowly eliminating the distortion in the labor market will slowly reduce 
~,tput below the status quo level. Citizens, ignorant of the economy's 
as a refutation of the micro-economicsi~ucture, could interpret this result 
-.... .-. 
:::. 
th~ry they have learned. The decision-maker, .s.lso ignorant of the econ~•~ 
structure, will be unable to "prove"--via changes in the measure of success•• 
that his policies are correct until he has eliminated both the labor market 
distortion and the capital market distortion. Even if everyone has the same 
uses the same index of success~ "incremental decision-making"discount rate and 
may be very controversial unless ev,;,ryone is prcpar.:!d to suspend judgment on 
a new program until the results of th-:? entj :re set of new polj_cies ,,1;,e..,J.mown. 
1char es ,, L.1.n om, """b ,.nc•:: f • rcug e._,1 E dbl .1...e .-,c" ir.·.. ~ o ,...,_nud·,11.ng1 • Th h' , " Publi· 
Administration Revie~, 19 (Sp:::irsg 1959) ~ p,, £6, 
2Lindblom arg._,..~r: that consen,;;us frequcr.tly c.s.n be reached only on 
policies and not on objectiv,c:r:; but. pr::sumc'!Jly one needs agreement on indices 
of success in order to evaluF..tf?. polj_d.es., 
